We propose simulation based estimation for discrete sequential move games of perfect information which relies on the simulated moments and importance sampling. We use importance sampling techniques not only to reduce computational burden and simulation error, but also to overcome non-smoothness problems. The model is identi…ed with only weak scale and location normalizations, monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples.
INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium is one of the cornerstones of modern economic theory, with substantive application in all major …elds in economics, particularly industrial organization. It is the benchmark theoretical model for analyzing strategic interactions among a handful of players.
Given the importance of gaming in economic theory, the empirical analysis of games has been the focus of a recent literature in econometrics and industrial organization, such as Tamer (2003) , Berry & Tamer(2007) , Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007) , Aradillas-Lopez (2007 , 2008 , Ciliberto & Tamer (2009) , Bajari, Hong, Krainer & Nekipelov (2010) and Bajari, Hong & Ryan (2010) (hereafter BHR).
Econometrically, a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model, such as the conditional logit or multinomial probit. An agent's utility is often assumed to be a linear function of covariates and a random preference shock. However, unlike a discrete choice model, utility is also allowed to depend on the actions of other agents. Such modeling strategy was …rst suggested by the seminal work of Bresnahan & Reiss (1990 , 1991 . Although there are numerous studies on both methodology and empirical applications of game-theoretic models, the most widely studies is the class of incomplete information simultaneous-move games (normal form) and dynamic games, see Tamer (2003) , Bajari, Hong, Krainer & Nekipelov (2010) and Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007) . The complete information games received fewer studies due to its computational complexity, since it involves multidimensional integrals. More recently, Ciliberto & Tamer (2009) and BHR (2010) provide simulation-based estimators for static complete information discrete games.
Furthermore, estimation of sequential-move (extensive form) games has been quite limited, especially on its' general form, Berry (1992) , Mazzeo (2002) and Schmidt-Dengler (2006) estimate some simpli…ed sequential-move games with special game structure. The estimation of the general class of sequential move games has su¤ered from its computational complications, Maruyama (2009) provides a simulation-based estimator for the general class of discrete-choice perfect information sequential move games with a modi…ed version of the GHK simulator (Geweke (1989 (Geweke ( , 1991 , Hajivassiliou & McFadden (1998) and Keane (1990 Keane ( , 1994 ), which he called as "sequential GHK". The estimator provided by Maruyama (2009) essentially is a maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimator, As is well known, MSL is biased for any …xed number of simulations, in order to obtain p T consistent estimators, one needs to increase the number of draws S so that S p T ! 1. Wang & Graham (2009) provides a generalized maximum entropy (GME) estimator for this class of games which avoids the usual multidimensional integrals by using the data constraints instead of the moment constraints, they reformulate the estimation problem as a mixed-integer nonlinear optimization problem since there are logical connections between endogenous variables among the equilibrium conditions, although the computational burden is acceptable for most applications, it is hard to construct large sample properties for this GME estimators, since essentially it is a nonsmooth estimation.
In this paper, we propose a simulation based estimator for discrete sequential move games of perfect information which relies on the simulated moments and importance sampling. The moment conditions implied by the model equilibrium conditions in discrete sequential move games of perfect information contain multidimensional integrals, in principle, one can use straightforward monte carlo simulations to get unbiased estimators for such multidimensional integrals, but there are several problems that can arise with estimators based on such simulations. First, there are discrete parts of the model, the MSM objective function is typically discontinuous in the parameter vector, making it hard to minimize correctly; Second, the straightforward monte carlo simulations need to solve the game numerous times, typically once for every draw, for every observation, for every parameter vector that is ever evaluated in an optimization procedure. If we have T observations, performs N S simulation draws, and optimization requires R function evaluations, estimation requires solving the model N S T R times, this can be computationally time consuming. In spirit of Ackerberg (2009) and BHR (2010), we make use of importance sampling to overcome both of the problems. In order to make use of importance sampling, it is important to make sure that the tails of the importance density are not too thin in a neighborhood of the parameter that minimizes the objective function in the estimation procedure, the GME estimator proposed by Wang & Graham (2009) can be used to construct the importance density, or one can make use of the MSL estimator proposed by Maruyama (2009) . As noted by Maruyama (2009), the estimation of sequential games has some distinctive features and advantages over simultaneous games, the most advantage is that perfect information sequential games can utilize the notion of subgame perfection, which guarantees the existence of unique equilibria, however, in simultaneous games of complete information, the existence of multiple equilibria is sometimes considered problematic or at least an issue to deal with (see for example, Ciliberto & Tamer, 2007; BHR, 2010) .
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the general discrete sequentialmove games to be estimated and formulate its equilibrium conditions, the assumptions for the identi…cation and estimation also are presented. Section 3 formalizes our simulation and estimation approach. Monte carlo simulations are conducted in section 4. Section 5 concludes, and provides limitations and future work.
THE MODEL
In the model, there are T independent repetitions of a sequential move game of perfect information (extensive form game). In each game there are i = 1; :::; N t players, each with the …nite set of actions A it . De…ne A t = i A it and let a t = (a 1t ; :::; a it ; :::a N t ) denote a generic element of A t . Without loss of generality, the order of subscripts for players (1; :::; N t ) also represents the decision order of the sequential move game in each repetition, that means player 1 makes decision …rst and player N t at the end. Player i's von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility is a map u it : A t ! R, where R is the real line. Since we study the sequential move game, the corresponding equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), this can be achieved when every player expects no gain from individually deviating from its equilibrium strategy in its every subgame, the standard technique for solving the SPE is backward induction, furthermore, the …nite sequential move game of perfect information where there is no player is indi¤erence between any two outcomes has a unique SPE. We will sometimes drop the subscript t for simplicity when no ambiguity would arise.
Following Bresnahan & Reiss (1990 , 1991 , assume that the vNM utility of player i can be written as:
In Equation (1), player i's vNM utility from action a is the sum of two terms. The …rst term i (x; a; ) is a function which depends on a, the vector of actions taken by all of the players, covariates x, the players' characteristics and some other variables which in ‡uence the utility, and parameters , covariates x are observed to the econometrician. The second term is i (a), a random preference shock which re ‡ects the information about utility that is common knowledge to the players but not observed by the econometrician. Unlike Maruyama (2009), here the preference shocks depend on the entire vector of actions a, not just the actions taken by player i. As argued by BHR (2010), this is a more general setting and seems straightforward within the game framework, think about a simple entry game, the unobserved information of one player to econometrician may be di¤erent not only among players but also action vector dependent. i (a) are assumed to be independent or some known dependence, let i denote the vector of the individual i (a) and i denote the vector of all the shocks. we will discuss more about the structure of i in the identi…cation and estimation section.
As noted above, the equilibrium concept corresponding to the sequential move game of perfect information, SPE, is a equilibrium strategy pro…le which means that every player expects no gain from individually deviating from its equilibrium in every subgame. A strategy of player i 2 N is a function that assigns an action in A i to each nonterminal history, , is any solution for the decisions of the players that satis…es:
for all i = 1; :::; N and all a i 6 = a SP E i .
where a >i (a SP E <i ; a i ) is a SPE action pro…le for the subgame that starts from player i + 1 given the decisions of the preceding players, a i . This equilibrium conditions are de…ned recursively and the solution can be easily calculated by the backward induction for any given parameters , observed covariates, x, and unobservable shocks . Kuhn's theorem ensures the existence of solutions of the inequality system (2) but makes no claim of uniqueness, thus we can conclude that every …nite sequential move game of perfect information has a SPE.
As noted by Berry & Tamer(2007) , dealing with multiple equilibria complicate the identi-…cation problem, fortunately, a modi…ed version of Kuhn's theorem ensures the uniqueness of equilibria of …nite sequential move games of perfect information, which is presented in theorem 1.
Theorem 1 Every …nite sequential move game with perfect information in which no player is indi¤erence between any two outcomes has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. See Osborne & Rubinstein (1994) .
Obviously, the indi¤erence case can be ignored in our econometric model since we work with continuous latent payo¤s ( i (a) has an atomless distribution). Given such structure of the discrete choice sequential move game, our task is to estimate and draw an inference about the parameters of payo¤ functions, , with the observation of action pro…le a o , some covariates which have e¤ect on the payo¤s, x, and an exogenous decision order. Note that the actual payo¤ levels are unobserved, since in most case, we can not determine what they should be, i.e. they are the latent variables. Before presenting our estimation strategy, some assumptions about the model structure are introduced.
Assumptions
Assumption 1 (Exogenous Decision Order) The decision order of agents in the sequential move game is exogenous.
Although the exact decision order of agents is rarely observed, we can estimate sequential move games by imposing di¤erent decision order assumptions, this restriction only excludes the endogenous decision order which may alter the uniqueness of the game structure.
Assumption 2 (Scale and Location Normalizations) The payo¤ of one action for each player are …xed at a known constant.
As argued by BHR (2010), this restriction is similar to the argument that we can normalize the mean utility from the outside good equal to a constant, usually zero, in a standard discrete choice model. One clearly …nd that from the equilibrium condition (2) that adding a constant to all deterministic payo¤s does not perturb the set of equilibria, so a location normalization is necessary. A scale normalization is also necessary, as multiplying all deterministic payo¤s by a positive constant does not alter the SPE. This restriction is subsumed in the following assumption about the distribution of the error terms.
Assumption 3 (Regularity Conditions of Random Shocks) The joint distribution of = ( i (a)), G( j ) is independent and known to all agents and the econometrician.
This restriction allows G to be any known joint parametric distribution, identi…cation in this game with unknown G is complicated, and since our estimation is based on the simulation which relies on the distribution of error terms, the case with unknown G will not be dealt with here.
ESTIMATION
Next, we propose computationally e¢cient simulation based estimators for and , the parameters governing agents' deterministic payo¤s and the error terms' distribution, given the observations of a sequence (a t ; x t ) of action pro…les and covariates. To form the estimation framework, enumerate the elements of A from k = f1; :::; #Ag. Denote the observation at 
where I( ) is the usual indicator function, f (x t ; t ; ) is an algorithm which solves the game for any given x t , t and , obviously, it is corresponding to the model equilibrium conditions
(2). Denote the probability that a speci…c action pro…le k is played implied by the model as P (kjx t ; ) and collect them into a vector P (ajx t ; ), where
At the true parameters of the data-generating process the predicted probability of each action equals its empirical probability of each action k: E[(y t P (ajx t ; ; ))jx t ] = 0 at = 0 ; = 0 (5)
Note that, because the probability of all of the elements of must sum to one, one of these probabilities will be linearly dependent on the others, so there are e¤ectively #A 1 conditional moment restrictions. Obviously, the expectation of any function w(x t ) of the conditioning variables multiplied by the di¤erence between y t and the predicted probabilities is identically zero at the true parameters, i.e.
In principle, the value of and , say^ and^ , that set the sample analog of this moment
equal to zero or as close as possible to zero is a consistent estimator of 0 and 0 . Under appropriate regularity conditions, one obtains asymptotic normality of the estimators (Hansen, 1982) , and as the number of moments used increases, one can approach asymptotic e¢ciency by the right choice of instruments (i.e. the w function).
To make use of such GMM estimation, we should overcome some obstacles, the …rst obstacle is that the predicted probabilities P (ajx t ; ; ) which de…ned by (4) is not easily computable, since it involves a multidimensional integral, thus simulation enters the picture.
As can be found below, a straightforward Monte Carlo procedure is not practical due to the computational burden and discreteness in f (x t ; t ; ), we make use of importance sampling to overcome such problems.
Simulation
The straightforward way of simulating
is by averaging f (x t ; t ; ) over a set of N S random draws ( 1 ; :::; N S ) from the distribution
P (ajx t ; ; ) is trivially an unbiased simulator of the true expectation P (ajx t ;
McFadden (1989) and Pakes & Pollard (1989) prove statistical properties of the MSM estimator that set the simulated moment:
as close as possible to zero. The most important of these statistical properties is the fact that these estimators are typically consistent for …nite N S. The intuition behind this is that simulation error averages out over observations as T ! 1. This consistency property
gives the estimator an advantage over alternative estimation approaches such as maximum simulated likelihood (MSL), which typically is not consistent for a …nite number of simulation draws. Another nice property of these estimators is that the extra variance imparted on the estimates due to the simulation is relatively small, asymptotically it is 1=N S. As noted above, an important obstacle of making use of MSM estimation procedure in our sequential game estimation is that f (x t ; t ; ) typically is not continuous in , since the algorithm for solving the discrete sequential move game of perfect information essentially is a combination of several indicator functions, which is not continuous in . The discreteness in f (x t ; t ; ) will generate the discreteness inP (ajx t ; ; ), as can be found via a simple entry game conducted in example 1. Thus the simulated moments,G T ( ; ), will tend not to be continuous in , typically having both ‡ats and jumps. This can be very problematic in the numeric minimization ofG T ( ; ), derivative based methods are useless.
Example 1 To illustrate the discreteness problem, consider a simple two-…rm sequential entry game, where …rm 1 moves …rst. Each …rm has the following pro…t function:
where a i 2 f0; 1g is …rm i's action, N (a) is the number of entrants for a action pro…le a. For exposition we focus on the 2nd element of y, we can write this out explicitly as:
[0 > x 1 1 + 2 + 1 (1; 0) \ 0 > x 2 1 + 2 2 + 2 (1; 1)] [ [0 > x 1 1 + 2 2 + 1 (1; 1) \ 0 x 2 1 + 2 2 + 2 (1; 1)] \ x 2 1 + 2 + 2 (0; 1) 0
Obviously, function f is not continuos in . The straightforward simulator P ((0; 1)jx t ; ; ) = 1 N S
[0 > x 1 1 + 2 + 1;ns (1; 0) \ 0 > x 2 1 + 2 2 + 2;ns (1; 1)] [ [0 > x 1 1 + 2 2 + 1;ns (1; 1) \ 0 x 2 1 + 2 2 + 2;ns (1; 1)] \ x 2 1 + 2 + 2;ns (0; 1) 0
is also not continuos in .
In spirit of Ackerberg (2009) and BHR (2010), we make use of importance sampling to reduce the non-smoothness problem 1 . Importance sampling is most noted for its ability to reduce simulation error and computational burden, and was …rst used in game-theoretic models estimation by BHR (2010), who estimated norm form complete information games.
First, we change the variable of integration in Equation (4) from to u. Let h(ujx; ; ) denote the density of u, conditional on x, and , and g( i (a)j ) the density of i (a). Then the density h(ujx; ; ) is:
If we change the variable of integration in
from to u, then P (ajx t ; ; ) becomes:
In order to use importance sampling, introduce the importance density q(u), rewrite Equation (10) as:
We can then simulate P (ajx t ; ; ) by draw random variables u 1 ; :::u N S from q(u) and constructP
Note that
So the importance sampling simulatorP (ajx t ; ; ) is an unbiased simulator for the true expectation. The most important property of this simulator is thatP (ajx t ; ; ) will generally be continuous in and since it only depends on and through h(ujx t ; ; ) which is continuous in and given that g( j ) is continuous, this can be revealed by using this simulator in the simple two-player entry game which conducted in Example 1.
Example 2 (Ex.1 Cont') Consider the two-player entry game conducted in Example 1. For exposition we also only focus on the 2nd element of y:
obviously, given that g( j ) is continuous, this simulator is smooth in the underlying parameters.
Although the theory of importance sampling proves thatP (ajx t ; ; ) is a smooth and unbiased simulator for any choice of the importance density q(u) which has su¢ciently large support. However, as noted by BHR(2010), as a practical matter, it is important to make sure that the tails of the importance density q(u) are not too thin in a neighborhood of the parameter that minimizes the objective function in our estimator. One natural choice of q(u) is h(ujx; ; ) where and are some guess or preliminary estimate of and . To ensure that the importance density q(u) are not too thin in a neighborhood of the estimated parameters, we found that the generalized maximum entropy (GME) estimator proposed by Wang & Graham (2009) is a good choice for and , also we can set the importance density equals to the distribution of utilities conditional on x in the GME estimation, this means that for each value of x we simulate the GME estimation N S times. At the same time, sincê P (ajx t ; ; ) only depends on and through h(ujx t ; ; ) which is continuous in and given that g( j ) is continuous, in computations, the f (u ns ) and q(u ns ) should be stored as they do not vary as the underlying parameters changes in the estimation procedure, then as the underlying parameters changes, one only need re-compute the density h(ujx; ; ).
The Estimator
Given the importance simulatorP (ajx t ; ; ), we can replace the moment conditions in Equation (6) by its simulation analog:
Then for a positive de…nite weighting matrix W T , the MSM estimator is:
To demonstrate the performance of our estimator in …nite samples, we conducted a simple Monte Carlo experiment using the simple sequential entry game introduced in Example 1.
There are two players and each player has the following pro…t function:
where player 1 moves …rst. We assume that x 11 N (20; 1), x 12 N (11; 3); x 21 N (26; 1); x 22 N (11; 3) and x i3 = N (a), where N (a) is the number of entrants for a action pro…le a, and it (a), the idiosyncratic error term, are drawn from standard normal distribution. As discussed previously, our model requires both scale and location normalizations, so we assume the variance of the error terms is one and the payo¤s of not entering are zero.
Thus our game has three unknown parameters: 1 ; 2 and 3 . We generated 1000 samples of size T = 25; 50; 100; 200 and 400 to assess the …nite sample properties of our estimator, …rst use importance simulator (12) getP (ajx t ; ; ) for each t then generate the simulated analog (15). The true parameter vector was chosen as 1 = 1, 2 = 1 and 3 = 8.
In Table I we report the mean, median, standard deviation, mean bias, median bias and mean square error (MSE) for our estimator for …ve sample sizes, T = 25; 50; 100; 200
and 400, which show that our estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples, the payo¤ parameters are estimated near their true values, and as the sample size increase, the estimates become more precisely. One may …nd that parameters are estimated much less precision when sample size is 400, this may due to the large scale non-linear algorithm we've chosen. Actually, since the objective function of our estimate is not globally concave, we choose the global optimization algorithm "lgo" in GAMS, a more meticulous modi…cation on the algorithm details should increase the performance of our estimation in large samples. In this paper, we developed the simulation based estimation for the discrete sequential move game of perfect information, which relies on the simulated moments and importance sampling. We use importance sampling techniques not only to reduce computational burden and simulation error, but also to overcome non-smoothness problems. Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples. The most limitation of our estimation is that it relies on the known distribution of random preference shocks which is rarely known to researchers, working with the unknown G( j ) is an important topic for future research. Another interesting issue concerns the e¢cient estimation of the simulated conditional moments, although in a full parametric model, we can make use of the …rst order condition of the likelihood function, the simulated score may not exist since the simulated choice probability can be zero in some random draws.
